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Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO offers, as last 
resort countermeasures, withdrawal of the concessions the state parties had agreed to in 
their schedules of commitments. The problem is that such a withdrawal of concessions 
would have very little impact on the economy and consequently on the behaviour of 
the respondent state if that party happened to be a developed state vis-à-vis a small, 
developing country. To deal with this situation a remedy of “collective 
countermeasures”, contained in Article 54 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
of the International Law Commission (ILC), has been proposed; it has been argued that 
this remedy should apply, as a general principle of public international law, as a last 
resort in WTO disputes. The counter-arguments are, first, that the WTO regime is a 
self-contained regime and therefore the general principles of international law do not 
apply in this case, and, second, that the WTO legal system is based on a distinct idea of 
“compliance” with WTO rules as a primary remedy, as opposed to reparative and 
punitive justice. The concept of “compliance” with WTO rules is akin to the concept of 
“liberalization”, which is a linchpin of the WTO multilateral system. Therefore the idea 
of “collective countermeasures” or, in other words, “collective punishment” is 
repugnant to the principles of WTO law, and it is argued that the present remedies 
under Article 22 of the DSU are adequate. 
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Introduction 
n the face of non-compliance, when all else fails, retaliations under Article 22 of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO represent the 
countermeasures of last resort. These measures take the form of withdrawal of the 
negotiated commitments vis-à-vis the respondent. Since the birth of the WTO, such a 
withdrawal has occurred in a number of cases.1 In cases where both the parties are 
developed member states or where one of the developing member states is an 
important trading partner, e.g., China, India or Brazil, retaliations are likely to 
represent adequate sanctions because both parties stand to lose or gain more or less 
equally. The risk of loss in such cases will induce compliance. The situation is quite 
different when the complainant is a developing country or one of the least-developed 
countries (LDCs), and a very small economy is pitted against a developed state. In this 
scenario the retaliations, that is to say the withdrawal of commitments by a smaller 
state, probably will not have much impact on the economy of the developed state, 
while the situation could have a devastating impact on the economy of the developing 
state or LDC. The US–Gambling2 case, for example, represents one such scenario.  
To deal with a situation like this, an idea of “collective retaliation” has been 
floated. In the face of non-compliance it is generally argued that the Article 22 DSU 
retaliatory measures “are not coercive enough to induce compliance”3; in order to be 
more satisfactorily coercive, it has been argued, the retaliations should be applied 
collectively by member states against the respondent on an “all for one” basis. The 
problem is that the WTO rules under the DSU do not allow collective retaliations, and 
the general principles of international law regarding collective measures embedded in 
the International Law Commission (ILC) Article 54 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility [hereinafter Article 54 ILC] do not apply in the case of the WTO 
because the WTO is thought to be a self-contained regime. Neither the dispute 
settlement panels nor the Appelate Body (AB) have ever considered, and rightly so, 
issues to do with the principles of state responsibility in their rulings and 
recommendations. Thus it is argued in this article that the unavailability of collective 
retaliatory sanctions under Article 22 DSU and the article’s less coercive nature are 
actually key to the success of the WTO as a multilateral institution. The next section 
assesses whether the WTO is a self-contained regime, and section three deals with the 
application of customary international law in the WTO regime. Section four assesses 
the status of the principle of collective retaliation in international law and WTO law.  
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The WTO as a Self-contained Regime 
he idea of a “self-contained regime” is not a new idea; rather, it may have the 
status of a customary law. Nevertheless, its first clear definition and acceptance 
as a feature of public international law occurred in the Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,4 when the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) held clearly that diplomatic law was a self-contained regime: 
The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime 
which, on the one hand, lays downs the receiving states’ obligations 
regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to 
diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by 
members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the 
receiving state to counter any such abuses….5 
The court went on to clarify, suggesting that in the event of a breach of a 
diplomatic law an injured party was not permitted to pursue a remedy other than the 
one available in the diplomatic law. The ICJ said that “diplomatic law itself provides 
the necessary means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities by members 
of diplomatic or consular missions.”6 From this it transpires that self-contained 
regimes constitute exclusive areas of law where general principles of international law 
do not apply unless they are permitted directly or indirectly by that very regime. 
According to this notion, a self-contained regime exists as an exclusive subsystem. 
The idea of the WTO as a self-contained regime can be supported on the basis that it 
is centered on the idea of trade liberalization, which means market access and trade 
between individual commercial entities across international borders.7  
Exceptions to Self-contained Regime 
This makes it look as if WTO law and international law are two separate systems 
underpinned by altogether different underlying principles, but this does not seem to be 
the case. The WTO is not the only self-contained regime within international law; 
there are also other self-contained regimes, for example diplomatic law, the law of the 
sea and so on. As with these other specific areas of international law, WTO law, as a 
part of international economic law, is also in turn part of international law, albeit, like 
many other specialised areas of international law, it specifically regulates one sphere, 
namely economic relations relating to international trade.8 By regulating international 
trade, WTO law can also implicate other specialised areas of international law,9 for 
example, environmental law, human rights law and so on. It would be inconceivable 
that such areas of international law would not impact upon WTO law. 
It is unimaginable that all these specialized areas of international law could be 
completely separate from general public international law. Actually, they have 
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developed under the customary law or treaties, and they exist as separate fields of 
international law. Therefore, the application of the general principles of international 
law in these separate areas is limited but not absolutely prohibited. For example, 
Article 3(2) of the DSU allows the application of customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law for the interpretation of the WTO treaty. In the US–Gasoline 
case the Appellate Body held that in the light of Article 3(2) of the DSU the WTO 
agreements are “not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law”.10 
Furthermore, beyond this there are principles of international law that cannot be 
prohibited by the self-contained regimes, first, because of their unique character as 
these are regarded as jus cogens, and second, because the parties in those regimes 
have explicitly agreed to be obliged to another treaty.  
The WTO as a System of Lex Specialis (Special Rules)  
In customary international law, special rules allow state parties to contract out of 
certain areas of international law in order to regulate relationships among them. The 
International Law Commission has codified the principle of lex specialis in Article 55 
of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as follows: 
These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or 
implementation of the international responsibility of a state are governed 
by special rules of international law. 
The justification for special rules is that with them in place states are better able to 
conduct their relations in a specific area of international law. The presumption is that 
“a specific set of rules has priority over a general set of rules because the specific set 
is supposed to be an elaboration of the more general set.”11 This means special rules 
prevail over the general rules. However, there are some exceptions to the concept of 
lex specialis in that they cannot exclude or modify jus cogens and cannot harm the 
position of the third parties.12  
Thus Article 55, quoted above, provides that the general principles of international 
law can be excluded and modified by special rules. This also means that the special 
rules will only modify the general rules “to the extent” provided for in the special 
rules. This connotes that situations that are not within the reach of special rules are 
still governed by the general principles of international law.    
The DSU rules, including the rules relating to the consequences of breaches of the 
WTO rules, are a special set of rules and therefore constitute a system of lex 
specialis;13 they exclude the application of the general principles of international law 
to the extent provided for by the special, self-contained regime of the DSU. In this 
context, if there is a conflict between the general rules of international law and the 
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treaty rules, it is the treaty rules that prevail. Thus lex specialis or a self-contained 
regime, being the latter, will prevail. In the absence of a treaty provision that prohibits 
the application of a general principle of international law, or where the existing 
remedies are insufficient, the general principles of international law would apply.14 
According to the ILC, the difference between lex specialis and a self-contained regime 
is merely one of degree, as ILC Article 55 on lex specialis is meant to cover both these 
notions.15  
The Application of Customary International Law Rules 
in the WTO Regime  
rticle 3(2) of the DSU permits the interpretation of “the existing provisions of 
[the covered] agreements in accordance with international rules of interpretation 
of public international law”. This refers not only to articles 30 and 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, but also to the other rules of customary law that 
have not been codified, for example, the notion of evaluative interpretation, which 
was applied by the panel and the Appellate Body in US–Shrimp Products,16 and the 
concept of lex specialis, which is not contained in the Vienna Convention.  
In turn, Article 32(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention paves the way, apart from the 
rules of interpretation, for the application of the general principles of international 
law. It says that that in interpreting the treaty, apart from the treaty itself  “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” must be 
taken into account. The Appellate Body echoed this view when it said that the covered 
agreements must not be interpreted in clinical isolation from public international 
law.17 This view was further reiterated in Korea–Measures Affecting Government 
Procurement. The panel in this case made reference to the rules of customary 
international law as follows: 
We do not see any basis for arguing that the terms of reference [in DSU 
Article 7.1] are meant to exclude reference to the broader rules of 
customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the 
Panel.18   
This means that dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body will seek to 
apply rules that are not contained in the covered agreements of the WTO but rather are 
found in the realm of general public international law. 
Furthermore, the rules of international law also apply to procedural matters within 
the dispute settlement system. In European Communities–Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas,19 the panel applied the rules relating to locus standi. 
This practice can be seen in a number of other cases, for example, relating to burden 
of proof,20 representation by private council,21 the admissibility of amices curiae 
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brief,22 judicial economy,23 drawing of an adverse inference,24 the concept of 
substantial interest,25 the rights of defence,26 abuse of rights,27 estoppel and 
acquiescence28 and notion of precaution.29  
The above practice by the panel and the Appellate Body implies that there is no 
prohibition on the application of the general principles of international law within the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Furthermore, the absence of an explicit provision in 
the DSU excluding the application of international law within the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is an implicit acceptance of the application of international law 
to the WTO dispute settlement process.30 Unlike the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the statute of the ICJ, the DSU does not explicitly contain a provision on 
applicable law; therefore, it is not possible to interpret that the DSU excludes the 
application of all other rules.31 The Appellate Body seems to have followed this 
reasoning,32 and this view was reflected clearly in Korea–Measures Affecting 
Government Procurement as follows: 
We take note that Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that we seek within the 
context of a particular dispute to clarify the existing provisions of the 
WTO agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law. However, the relationship of the WTO 
agreements to customary international law is broader than this. Customary 
international law applies generally to the economic relations between the 
WTO members. Such international law applies to the extent that the WTO 
treaty agreements do not “contract out” from it. To put it another way, to 
the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a 
covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that 
the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to 
the process of treaty formation under the WTO.33  
This case creates an important precedent, and it suggests that the WTO is not an 
isolated area of law; rather, it is very much part of general international law.  
Article 3(2) of the DSU also contains a provision that the dispute settlement 
organs “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements”.34 This might apparently seem to go against the application of general 
principles of international law in the WTO dispute settlement system, but this is not 
how this provision should be interpreted. The application of the general principles of 
international law would apply to interpretation of the existing rights and obligations of 
the parties or to filling the gaps in the WTO rules without adding to or diminishing the 
rights and obligations of the parties. The primary function of the general principles of 
international law in this case is to explain or clarify the given scenario in a WTO 
dispute either way but certainly not to disturb the rights and obligations of the parties 
contained in the provisions of the covered agreements of the WTO. 
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Collective Countermeasures (Retaliations) in 
International Law 
Judicial View and Recent Practice 
The notion of collective countermeasures seems to be a concept alien to international 
law. The state practice suggests that countermeasures are available only to the injured 
parties in international law, and this is on the basis of an important concept of locus 
standi in international law. This principle was firmly applied in the South West Africa 
case,35 where the ICJ held that Liberia and Ethiopia had no legal interest in South 
Africa’s treatment of the inhabitants of Namibia. Although both Liberia and Ethiopia 
were original members of the League of Nations, and as a consequence had certain 
rights and obligations under the mandate agreement between the League of Nations 
and South Africa, the ICJ held that the enforcement of the agreement was a matter for 
the league alone. The reasoning of the court for such a decision was based on the 
concept of locus standi, meaning that the individual member states, in this case 
Liberia and Ethiopia, had suffered no injury to themselves; therefore, they did not 
have the independent or inherent right to bring claims for breaches of the mandate 
agreement. This point of view was further reiterated in the case of Military and 
Paramilitary in and against Nicaragua,36 where the ICJ was asked to consider 
whether the United States had the unilateral right to use force in response to 
Nicaragua’s action against other Central American States. Although the court in this 
case ruled that third states could contribute in countermeasures, it categorically 
rejected the United States’ claim to have unilateral rights against Nicaragua.37 This 
reasoning suggests that unilateral countermeasures by third states are prohibited in 
international law. However, it does not rule out collective action under a treaty 
arrangement or under the auspices of the UN. 
The contrary view is that the legitimacy of collective countermeasures in 
international law is based on the assumption that the multilateral agreements “from a 
broader perspective have a multilateral effect in the event of their violation”.38 Thus, a 
breach of a provision of a multilateral agreement by a member state impairs the 
interest of all other members, and therefore collective measures are required as a last 
resort remedy. The purpose of these collective measures is to induce compliance. Such 
a rule of international law will give equal protection particularly to smaller states 
within a treaty arrangement.  
The recent state practice differs somewhat from the traditional view, described in 
preceding paragraphs, held by the ICJ. During the Persian Gulf War between Iraq and 
Iran, navigation of neutral vessels was endangered in the Persian Gulf. Some neutral 
states deployed forces to protect their flags and other neutral-flag vessels from the two 
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warring nations. The UN did not oppose the actions of the neutral states in deploying 
their forces. Although this deployment of forces was collective in nature, it is difficult 
to measure its legal significance without any treaty arrangement behind such actions.  
ILC Article 54: Codif ication of International Law Regarding 
Collective Countermeasures  
Article 54 of the ILC contains a general principle about “Measures taken by States 
other than an injured State”; it states, 
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under 
article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to 
take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach 
and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of 
the obligation breached.  
Article 48 is about “Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured 
State”.39 
An important argument against the application of the general principle of 
collective retaliation contained in Article 54, and in favour of the lex specialis (or self-
contained regime), is that it is the will of the parties to a treaty that they want to be 
bound by its regime, whereas the application of the general principle may be 
interpreted as contrary to the will of the parties. 
The general principle of international law would apply in the case of lex specialis 
(or self-contained regime) when this regime fails to provide a remedy, but this is an 
unlikely scenario in the case of the WTO. Like most self-contained regimes, the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism is capable of providing a remedy in every conceivable 
scenario, and to date it has done so successfully. Its last resort remedy, the withdrawal 
of concessions, is an adequate remedy here. In cases where compliance with the 
dispute settlement reports has been contested, the DSU provides recourse to the 
dispute settlement system under DSU Article 21(5). So, in circumstances of contested 
compliance and non-compliance the DSU provides adequate remedies, to which the 
parties have agreed a priori.  
WTO Countermeasures: I l lusory in Some Circumstances 
The primary purpose of retaliations is to induce compliance with WTO obligations. 
This purpose can only be achieved if there are substantial trade relations between the 
winning and the losing states. In a scenario where the opposing parties are a small 
developing state and a developed state, trade relations between them are likely to be 
minimal. In such circumstances, retaliatory measures by a developing country are 
likely to be ineffective in inducing the desired compliance with WTO rules from a 
developed state. The case US–Gambling is an example of this. This lack of efficacy of 
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the retaliatory measures and the consequent dissatisfaction of the winning party are 
the main complaints. 
Nevertheless, this inadequacy cannot be attributed to the failure of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism; it should be attributed rather to the nature of the WTO 
Agreement itself. Here, the issue of whether the treaty arrangements should be 
renegotiated to achieve different results is up to the member states; it is a debatable 
issue whether present treaty arrangements should be changed merely to benefit the 
developing states disproportionately. This would be an arbitrary and unacceptable 
change for the developed states.   
This failure to induce compliance does not mean that the WTO dispute settlement 
system cannot function properly. Rather, quite the opposite is true; it shows the 
system’s ability to deal with cases where compliance has become impossible and the 
withdrawal of concessions is the only practical and meaningful way out. Thus, there is 
an air of predictability to the whole WTO enforcement process. The withdrawal of 
concessions works as a valve in extreme situations. This enforcement process displays 
the success of the WTO rules and the WTO as an institution – they are capable of 
providing solutions for trade disputes between member states in all circumstances. 
In the above scenario of a dispute between developed and developing states, the 
fact that as countermeasures the retaliatory sanctions are illusory in nature – meaning 
that the winning state does not benefit from this situation in any way – is not material 
in the context of the overall success of the WTO as an institution. The issue here is not 
to seek benefit for the prevailing state but simply to stop the nullification and 
impairment of the benefits of the winning state. The withdrawal of concessions 
achieves this aim, and it allows the member states to reorganise their trade relations 
afresh. This represents a desirable solution for a very difficult situation where two 
parties have reached a dead end. Any other solution that is coercive in nature or has an 
element of punishment in it would be counterproductive in terms of facilitation of 
trade and the fundamental principles of the WTO.  
If collective measures are used against the respondent state, the only way out left 
to that state is to withdraw all its commitments under the relevant schedules. For 
example, this result was achieved by the United States in the US–Gambling case when 
it withdrew its commitments under GATS Article XXI. The idea of collective 
retaliations is repugnant to the idea of liberalisation of global trade that underpins the 
WTO. Collective retaliation does more harm then good; it represents a non-tariff 
barrier to international trade.   
The problem is that proponents of the collective retaliation theory would like to 
see the WTO remedies from the perspective of reparative and punitive theories of 
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justice,40 whereas WTO remedies are distinct, because primarily they seek compliance 
with WTO rules. Therefore, in any case, once a violation has been identified the 
parties are left to negotiate a settlement. The purpose is not to compensate the injury 
or punish the wrongdoer; rather, it is to create a legal situation where the chances of 
the same wrong happening again are minimized. Thus, the WTO remedies are similar 
to the declarative relief traditionally granted in public international law. This is a new 
approach to wrongful acts by one member state against another within a treaty 
arrangement. In a way, this innovative theorisation of remedies in international law 
presents a challenge to a developing international legal system that also leans towards 
reparative and punitive justice. The problem with the collective retaliation theory is 
that it is retrogressive in nature, and its proponents fail to see this. WTO remedies are 
associated with the ethos of a new, developing international legal system. 
Conclusion 
TO law is lex specialis, a self-contained law; it has its own enforcement 
mechanism. Article 22 of the DSU provides for last resort countermeasures, 
that is to say the withdrawal of the negotiated schedules of concessions. Critics of 
Article 22 countermeasures say these measures are not coercive enough, and in the 
face of their ineffectiveness the general principle contained in Article 54 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility (ILC), which allows the application of collective 
countermeasures, should apply. But the reality is that Article 54 ILC does not apply to 
DSU rules, because the DSU is a self-contained system regarded as lex specialis. 
Article 55 ILC permits this self-contained legal system. The DSU is able to deal with 
all kinds of circumstances relating to the enforcement of member states’ obligations. 
The idea of collective retaliations is repugnant to the ideals of the WTO, that is to say 
to liberalization and market access. The idea of collective retaliations is a step 
backward and inherently amounts to a non-tariff barrier to international trade. 
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responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an 
invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1.  
40.  Chorzow Factories case (1927). 
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